Welcome to the 'Real Logic' Project!

 

[These are the beginnings of a project on philosophical logic (real logic, as opposed to 'formal logic', the study of so-called 'formal languages'). It's actually not yet worth reading, but it can be watched while being developed ...]

 

 

Issue: (Real) Logic

This website-in-progress-under-development represents a research project devoted to what may be called 'Real Logic'. What is 'Real Logic' (what does the "real" mean)? Well, it is just logic, the art of thinking and working rationally, reasonably. But if it is just logic, why add "real"? Because the word "logic", nowadays, is misused for something else.

 

The attitide: truth beats tradition

One of the aims of this project is to deal with the curriculum of logic critically. Although it is hard to say what exactly belongs to the extension of the study of logic, it is obvious that a great deal of what is usually counted as a (relevant) 'logical' subject actually is not (relevant), and that not everything which the ancient logicians (including some more recent ones) handed down to us stands up to scrutiny. A great deal of what you will find on this page is not standard or commonsense material--but, we believe, true.

 

'Formal logic'

Among philosophers, the term 'logic' is applied, and by many even reserved for 'formal logic'. By that term (which has no established precise definition) I mean to refer to ...

(1) certain sets of signs (existential quantification, conjunction, material implication, etc.) provided by single 'logics' ('propositional logic', 'predicate logic', 'deontic logic', etc.); along with ...

(2) calculi (sets of rules which enable 'automatic' derivation between sentential expressions); and ...

(3) laws and definitions (of terms like 'formal truth', 'logical implication', etc.).

 

Re-definition of the term 'logic'

The use of the word 'logic' for these things actually seems to amount to a terminological mistake (though a rather well-established one). For ...

(a) The term 'logic', in normal language, refers to Real Logic, but not to 'formal logic'.

(b) The term 'formal logic' suggests an issue that is part of logic (i.e., Real Logic). However, in fact 'formal logic' does not seem to belong to Real Logic. Rational, reasonable thinking does not involve, let alone require, the use of those 'formal' signs, calculi and laws. Furthermore, as a matter of fact, formal logic does not facilitate rational, reasonable thinking (see 'Logical Flaws in Literature').

That the term 'formal logic' does not refer to an issue of logic at all may sound a bit strange, if you are used to that term—it did initially sound strange to me, at least—but as soon as you seriously think about the matter, you realise that it's a fact.

 

The connection between real  logic and formal 'logic'

Although Real Logic and formal 'logic' are different things, they are of course not unrelated.

(1) The most obvious relation is historical. In the past century, a school of philosophers, including philosophers such as Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein, Schlick and Carnap, pursued the development of a language which was supposed to be free of certain faults which, allegedly, normal language suffers from, such as essential vagueness, ambiguity, lack of clarity, as well as the capacity of even expressing logically awkward sentences. For the particular 'languages' (small sets of signs) which emerged from these efforts, the term 'logic' was often used, and is nowadays firmly established.

(2) Obviously, adherents of the suitability of formal 'logic' would add another connection. They believe that, as a matter of fact, the study and use of formal 'logic' is educational: it increases precision in thinking and arguing, both by (a) supplying precise expressions and derivation rules, and (b) by improving our thinking. (This educational function seems to me to be purely fictitious, however.) 

 

The study of Real Logic is neglected—due to the presence of 'formal logic' courses

To emphasise that Real Logic and 'formal logic' are different things, is highly relevant. Among other things, the view of 'formal logic' as real logic has caused a heavy, fundamental problem: Nowadays, students of philosophy are regularly compelled to the attendance of courses (titled 'Formal Logic', or 'Philosophical Logic', or just 'Logic') which are largely useless, if not indeed  noxious, at least when scholarly purposes are concerned. At the same time, students of philosophy are kept from learning what is so urgently needed for philosophical work, namely, Real Logic: the art of thinking and working rationally, reasonably. Because as a matter of fact, ironically, courses in 'formal logic' rather consistently replace courses in Real Logic.

 

Real Logic is missing (logical mistakes are omnipresent in academic philosophy)

The neglect of Real Logic is not just a postulate; it can be observed quite directly in the works of prominent philosophers. Examples including some of the most prominent arguments, offered by very prominent philosophers of the so-called 'analytic' tradition, such as G.E. Moore's idea of a 'naturalistic fallacy', M. Schlick's 'verificationist' theory of meaning, or W.v.O. Quine's objection against 'analytic' truths, to take but three. [Here [LINK to 'Some Logical Mistakes'] you can access the relevant analyses.] 

 

'Formal logic' is largely useless (of no actual avail) for philosophical work

The study of 'formal means' should be viewed as what it is: largely, the provision of some small sets of artificial signs which are in fact useless. That they are useless can be demonstrated. Ask a philosopher what the most relevant genuinely philosophical advances are which the study of those 'formal' signs and languages made possible, during, say, the past 100 years. I make a prediction (or rather, an inductive generalisation).

First of all, they will be puzzled at the question (!).

Secondly, they will try (thinking hectically, but trying hard not to show) to provide you with something.

Yet whatever they provide either ...

(a) will prove to be of no real philosophical (as opposed to, e.g., mathematical) relevance, or ...

(b) will in fact not have required the application of 'formal' signs or languages.

That 'formal symbols' are required for philosophical work, or advance progress in philosophical work, is simply not true.

 

'Real logic' is the basis of philosophy; it should be reinstalled

In earlier times, it was commonsense that Real Logic is the proper, solid basis on which philosophical work must be built. Today, the intensive and extensive occupation with 'formal logic' has suppressed the study of the laws of rationality and reason. 'They never come back', it is said: maybe this is true for Real Logic, too; but then, it will be true also for rational, reasonable work in philosophy. As long as we teach ours tudents the formalisation of thoughts which are packed with logical mistakes and flaws, philosophy is no more than a preposterous charade. To be worth taking seriously, philosophical work must be built on the proper definition and use of terms, on the avoidance of vagueness and ambiguity, and of dazzling terms like 'possible word' or 'grounding', on proper consideration of the distinction between inductive/deductive and empirical/non-empirical, and on a correct understanding of terms like 'a priori' / 'a posteriori' (as opposed to 'analytic'/'synthetic').

So let's get started. Instead of asking if they ever come back, let's just try to make it happen. Let's try to bring logic (Real Logic) back to philosophy.