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- What is 'Logic'?
- Logical Issues
- Elementary Semantics
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- *(Types of) Definition
- Varieties of 'Implication'
- The Role of 'Proofs'
- Propositional Logic, Deontic Logic
- 'Explanation'
- Falsification
- Concluding
- Types of Circularity
- Modality
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- 'a priori', 'analytic', 'contingent'
- 'Formal Logic'
- Common Language in Philosophy
- Definition
- Logical Flaws in Literature
- Schlick's (1936) definitions of 'meaning'
- Quine's (1951) rejection of 'analytic truths'
- Moore's (1903) 'analysis' of 'good'
- (v) Frege's (1892) definition of 'Bedeutung'
- ((v)) Lewis' (1970) re-definition of "true"
- (v) Quine's (1951) re-definition of "analytic"
- (v) Davidson's (1967) discussion of a fictive 'Frege' theory
- 'Formal Logic'
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- Notizblock
- Schlick's (1936) definitions of 'meaning'
- Quine's (1951) rejection of 'analytic truths'
- Moore's (1903) 'analysis' of 'good'
- (v) Frege's (1892) definition of 'Bedeutung'
- ((v)) Lewis' (1970) re-definition of "true"
- (v) Quine's (1951) re-definition of "analytic"
- (v) Davidson's (1967) discussion of a fictive 'Frege' theory
Logical Flaws in Prominent Arguments
[under development]
Particular examples for the neglect / shortage of Real Logic
o Kripke: inadequate interpretation of Wittgenstein (@interpretation, accuracy)
o Quine 1951: flawed interpretation of Kant's "analytic" (@interpretation, accuracy)
o Cappelen & Lepore: confusion of 'content' with 'character' (@Kaplan) (@terminology, accuracy)
o Sperber & Wilson: persistent confusion of technical term 'relevance' with natural notion of relevance (@term.y, accur.)
o Searle 1969, 1979, ...: recurring unmarked changes of conception of 'speech act' (terminology, accuracy)
o 'Speech act'; 'Bedeutung'; 'analytic': terminological confusion through re-definition (terminology, polysemisation)
o Mitchell Green (SEP): uninformed definition of 'illocutionary acts' (terminology, polysemisation)
o Logical positivists: inadequate 'use' of the central terms 'sense', 'metaphysical' (@terminology, adequacy)
o Searle: change between two senses of 'subjective' within his argument (terminology, accuracy)
o Moore 1903: flawed notion of definitional 'analysis' (@definition, analysis)
o Frege 1892: inadequate definition of "Bedeutung" (@definition, adequacy)
o Frege 1892: queer/obscure determination of the extension (?) of a statement as its truth value
o Davidson 1967: Discusses a theory of extension as a thery of 'meaning' (@terminological accuracy)
o Coherence theory of truth, consensus theory of truth: inadequate definition of 'true' (@definition, adequacy)
o Schlick 1936: multiple, inconsistent definition of 'meaning' (@definition, clarity, unambiguousness)
o Schlick: idiosyncratic re-definition of the term "Jugend" (@definition, adequacy)
o Ayer: inadequate notion of 'meaning [of life]' (@definition, adequacy)
o Bach & Harnish 1979: confusion of material equivalence with intensional definition (@definition, intensional def.)
o ... confusion of different 'varieties of' 'grounding'
o Mackie 1977: argumentatory footstomping (*'needs to ...', repeatedly) (@argument, missing argument)
o Mackie 1977: implausible premise (motivation internalism) (@argument, persuation/conclusion)
o Logical positivists: circular argument in the rejection of non-empirical philosophy (@circular argument)
o Popper (& others): inaccurate notion of 'induction' (@induction)
o Moore 1903: inexhaustive execution of an inductive argument (@induction problem)
o Quine 1951: inexhaustive execution of an inductive argumentat (@induction problem)
o Quine 1951: vast ignorance of the matter (accounts of 'meaning' in 1951) (@ignorance of facts)
o Lewis, acceptance of a plurality of possible worlds (@ignorance of apparent fact; weak argument for bold claim)
o Truth-conditional approaches of 'meaning': fading out of apparent facts (@'ignorance of facts')
o SEP entry 'Speech Acts': ignores state of the art in defining 'speech acts' (@'ignorance of facts')
o Quine 1951: circularity reproach based on confusion of 'definition' / 'denial of existence' (@circularity)
o xxx: confusion of different 'kinds of' necessity
o Wittgenstein: category mistake (in 'meaning = use') (@category mistake)
o Austin 1950; 1962: confusing act and object sense of 'truth', '(performative) utterance', (@category mistake)
o Searle 1969: regressive argument (implicit) in defining 'speech acts' (@petitio principii)
o Bach & Harnish 1979: category mistake (definition of 'convention') (@category mistake)
o Quine 1951: confusion of Kant's 'a priori' with Kants 'analytic' (@a posteriori, synthetic)
o Kripke: defines "metaphysical" necessity as an intension relation (@a posteriori, synthetic [sic])
o Tarski: pseudo-definition (in the definition of 'true' for formal languages) (@formal languages, motivation)
o confusion of statements using "If ... then ..." with statements of material impliation
o confusion of logical truth with truth within standard (formal) logic
o Thomasson: ...