(3) Moore's (1903) presentation of non-naturalism reflects a rather naive mis-conception of the nature of definition (he seems to take Hobbes' notion of the 'analysis' of phenomena and to mis-apply it to the 'analysis of terms).

Moore's famous argument against the definability of 'good' assumes a queer notion of 'definition'. '[W]e may', he argues, ...

when we define horse, mean something much more important. We may mean that a certain object, which we all of us know, is composed in a certain manner: that it has four legs, a head, a heart, a liver, etc., etc., all of them arranged in definite relations to one another. It is in this sense that I deny good to be definable. (Moore 1903, 8)

The 'important' sense of definition Moore refers to is really not a special sense of definition at all. There is no reason for a definition to refer to the worldly parts of it extension; indeed, it would be rather strange to define, for example, 'bachelors' in terms of their arms and legs (or any other parts of them).