MH = Matthias Holweger

fcd = Chris Dörge

o Unterscheidung zwischen 'explanation of a term' (= definition) und 'explanation of facts' (explanation, genuinely?) [Wird in der Praxis oft verwechselt -- gutes Beispiel: Quines Argument gegen 'meanings as entities' in "Two Dogmas", und zudem evda. passim ...] -- fcd

o Confusion of 'being meaningless' and 'being nonsensical' / 'representing a logical impossibility' (e.g. Schlick and Katz). -- MH

o 'Sneaky' weakening or other change of a claim one argues for (e.g. Searle's "very strong theoretical claim" in Making the Social World; Thomasson in arguing against existence criteria (?)). //: Lack of circumspicion, sometimes attempt at deception. -- MH

o Multiple (and often vague) re-definitions of the technical term "implicature" coined by Grice. //: Talking at cross purposes, proliferation of fruitless debates ('impliciture' vs. 'implicature' vs. 'explicature'). -- MH

o Schlick's apparent confusion of 'possibility' with 'belief'. Cf. 1936: 348: "Now, since we cannot boast of a complete and sure knowledge of nature's laws, it is evident that we can never assert with certainty the empirical possibility of any fact, and here we may be permitted to speak of degrees of possibility. Is it possible for me to lift this book? Surely! - This table? I think so! - This billiard table? I don't think so! This automobile? Certainly not! - It is clear that in these cases the answer is given by experience, as the result of experiments performed in the past. Any judgement about empirical possibility is based on experience and will often be rather uncertain; there will be no sharp boundary between possibility and impossibility". -- MH

o Crudely inadequate 'standard' definition of "indexicals" with respect to its intended extension ("...terms with a different referent or extension in different contexts of use..."). Cf.,e.g., Cappelen & Lepore 2005 and Braun 2015 (SEP). -- MH

o Epicurus' inadequate re-definition of "pleasure [hēdonḗ]": ... "So when we say that pleasure is the goal we do not mean the pleasure of the profligate or the pleasures of consumption, as some believe, either from ignorance or disagreement or from deliberate misinterpretation, but rather the lack of pain in the body and disturbance in the soul” (LM 6) Despite Cicero's clear-sighted observation more than 2000 years ago in De Finibus II, 30 that Epicurus here "calls a thing pleasure that no one ever called by that name before; he confounds two things that are distinct", Epicurus’ re-definition has engendered numerous misunderstandings and scholarly waste of paper to this day. Even today, Epicurus is regularly represented as someone who provides or suggests a genuine ' conception of pleasure', differing from other conceptions that represent pleasure as a positive experience of some sort. Accordingly, Epicurus' 'conception of pleasure' appears in just about every historically oriented lesson on the subject of pleasure (and happiness).-- MH